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THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEOLIBERAL REFORM 
EXPLAINING VOTER TURNOUT IN LATIN AMERICA'S DUAL 
TRANSITION ERA 
By R. Ryan Younger 
Department of Political Science 
Faculty Mentor: Dr. Jeffrey J. Ryan 
Department of Political Science 
Abstract: 
Voter turnout has declined precipitously during Latin 
America's 25 year experience with representative democracy. 
This decline has occurred in conjunction with another important 
trend. Across the region, economic development directed by 
state leaders and characterized by heavy state intervention has 
been replaced by a development model, commonly referred to as 
the Washington Consensus, in which markets are the preferred 
instrument for growth and the state plays a minimal role. This 
means that as people were casting off their undemocratic past, 
their economies were also undergoing fundamental change. 
This simultaneous turn to democratic governments and market-
based economic policy is commonly called Latin America's dual 
transition. The twin transition gives rise to the basic research 
question of this work: Is the dramatic decline in democratic 
participation throughout Latin America somehow linked to the 
political or economic consequences of market reform? 
First Election Last Election 
{Year} {Year} 
Argentina 83.3 (83) 76.1 (03) 
Bolivia 82 (85) 66.8 (02) 
Brazil 88.1 (89) 73.7 (02) 
Chile 94.7 (89) 87.2 (99) 
Colombia 58.1 (74) 45.6 (02) 
Costa Rica 83.3 (70) 67.1 (02) 
Dominican Rep. 75.7 (74) 79.1 (04) 
Ecuador 80.4 (79) 56 (02) 
El Salvador 79 (84) 67.3 (04) 
Guatemala 65 (85) 52.9 (03) 
Honduras 78 (81) 63.2 (01) 
Nicaragua 86.2 (90) 76 (01) 
Panama 73.7 (94) 75 (04) 
Paraguay 69 (93) 62.3 (03) 
Peru 81.8 (80) 70.4 (01) 
Uruguay 85.8 (84) 89.5 (04) 
Venezuela 96.5 ~73) 56.5 ~01) 
Averal.le 80.0 68.5 
Turnout Decline & Public Opinion: 
In order to proceed with an assessment of the proposed 
relationship between market reform and declining turnout, we 
must first establish that tum out is actually declining in the region 
and demonstrate discontent with the dual transition process. 
The raw turnout statistics for both presidential and legislative 
elections provide compelling evidence that turnout is declining 
in Latin America. During the democratic period, or the period 
between a nation's first and last election cycle, average presidential 
election turnout has declined more than 11 percent while turnout 
in legislative elections has seen more than a 16 percent decrease. 
(See Table 1) 
The fact that 14 of the ~i 7 countries under consideration 
have seen turnout declines of 10 percent or more in presidential 
and/or legislative elections is striking but it is not conclusive. In 
Difference First Election Last Election Difference 
{Year} {Year} 
-7.2 83.3 (83) 61.7 (03) -21.6 
-15.2 82 (85) 66.8 (02) -15.2 
-14.4 84.6 (90) 75.9 (02) -8.7 
-7.5 94.7 (89) 75.6 (01) -19.1 
-12.5 57.1 (74) 38.7 (02) -18.4 
-16.2 83.3 (70) 66.1 (02) -17.2 
3.4 69.5 (86) 49.1 (02) -20.4 
-24.4 80.3 (79) 56 (02) -24.3 
-11.7 67.7 (88) ·36.9 (03) 
-30.8 
-12.1 69.3 (85) 50.3 (03) -19 
-14.8 67.5 (81) 60.4 (01) -7.1 
-10.2 81 (90) .. 76 (01) 
-5 
1.3 73.7 (94) 76.9 (03) 3.2. 
-6.7 66.2 (93) : . 62.3 (03) ' 
-3.9 
-11.4 80.4 (80) . 62.7(01) 
-17.7 
3.7 87.9 (84) 
-· 
89.5 (04) 1.6 
-40 96.5F3l .. 38 ~00) -58.5. 
·11.5 77.9 61.3 
-16.6 
Data are from the electoral database of Dr. JeffRyan. 
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order to determine whether these drop offs are statistically 
significant, we need to conduct a difference of means or t-test. 
The standard cutoff point fort -test significance in social science 
research is .05 or better. (McClendon, 148) In our case, the null 
hypothesis, that the observed changes in turnout levels are 
insignificant in statistical terms, has a significance level of .008 
for both legislative and presidential turnout decline. (See Table 
2) This indicates a .8 percent chance that the shift in the mean is 
the result of random variation or, alternatively, it shows a 99.2 
percent chance that a nonrandom element or elements are causing 
the decline in turnout. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected 
with a high level of certainty . 
Table 2: 01fference of Means Test for· Turnout Change 
Pair 1 First Legislative .Election Turnout 
Last Legislative Election T umout 
Pair 2 First Presidential Election Turnout 
Last Presidential Election Turnout 
Data are from the electoral database of Dr. Jeff Ryan. 
Shift in the Mean Countries Significance 
-12.825 16 0.008 
·8.8975 16 0.008 
In order to determine a potential causal element that is 
driving Latin America's turnout decline, I tum to data from an 
annual region-wide poll. (Latinobarometro, 2002) The polling 
data indicates that nearly 70 percent of Latin Americans are 
neither contented with nor supportive of market reefrom. (See 
Table 3) This means that economic development is moving in a 
direction that is at odds with the will of the general populous. 
This is a striking and seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon 
within a representative democratic context. Given this, it is 
certainly plausible to suggest that this regional macro-level trend 
is associated with another, declining electoral participation. We 
must now conceptualize the link between turnout decline and 
economic reform. 
Table 3: Attitudes Toward State Intervention in Econom 
Country 
Argentina 
Bolivia, 
·. Brazil. 
·Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Pro-Market 
16.3 
23.2 
34.4 
17.4 
22.2 
25.4 
18.4 
36.7 
35.5 
35.2 
28.4 
25.3 
28.2 
29.5 
Undecided 
1.5 
3.9 
5.1 
2.5 
5.3 
4 
1.7 
2.8 
4.4 
6.2 
3.8 
2.3 
3.1 
2.7 
Pro-State 
82.3 
72.9 
60.6 
80.1 
72.5 
70.7 
79.8 
60.6 
60.1 
58.6 
67.8 
72.4 
68.7 
67.9 
Paraguay 29.3 1.9 68.8 
Peru 28.2 5.2 66.7 
Uruguay 10.8 2.4 86.8 
Venezuela 35.9 3.2 60.8 
Average 26.7 3.4 69.9 
(Latinobarometro, 2002 in United Nations Development Program, 2004) A pro-market 
. attitude indicates that poll respondents approve only of market-based development or have 
a general pro-market tendency. A pro-state attitude indicates that respondents approve of 
state-directed development or have a general pro-state tendency. 
Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Market 
Reform a~d Turnout Decline: 
There are two general ways of conceptualizing the impact 
of neoliberal reforms on electoral participation. The first focuses 
more narrowly on those tangible economic consequences of 
these reforms which based on existing findings from the voting 
literature can reasonably be expected to depress turnout. The 
second looks at the wider impact of the reforms on the very 
nature of policy decision-making within the region or, put 
differently, the political consequences of the Washington 
Consensus. The goal here is to link market reform to changes in 
the political realm which can plausibly be tied to reduced 
participation at the polls. 
The Impact of Economic Consequences 
Democracy places certain requirements on its citizenry 
that other political systems do not. It requires, unlike non-
democratic systems, that individuals follow policy issues, track 
the performance of elected representatives, participate in civil 
society and perhaps most importantly, vote. The fulfillment of 
these requirements takes resources such as time and money. 
Research on voting patterns in the developed world has 
consistently demonstrated that there is a positive relationship 
between socioeconomic status and turnout at the individual 
level. (Powell, 121) The inverse is also well-established in the 
literature: 
People with lower individual means (education, 
income, experience) have fewer resources to cover the 
costs of participation (processing the required 
information, reaching a decision, finding the time to 
vote). They are also more likely to develop apathetic 
attitudes towards the political system, and thus are 
more difficult for parties and institutions to motivate 
to vote. As a result, they usually vote less. It has been 
shown that participation increases with age (up until 
a certain threshold), income and social integration. 
(Anduiza, 647) 
A core reason for this relationship rests in the unique 
resource requirements of democratic citizenship. Individuals 
must have the time, means, information, and policy knowledge 
to engage leaders. They must have the wealth and organizational 
capacity to engage civil society. Finally, they must have the 
resources, stability, and information to cast an informed vote. 
The bulk of the research on the link between socioeconomic 
status and voting has focused on established industrial countries. 
Much less attention has been given to this relationship in the 
study of the developing democracies of Latin America. The 
exception is a 2003 study by Canton and Jorrat who performed 
an individual level socioeconomic analysis of voter turnout in 
Argentine presidential elections from 1983-1999. (Canton & 
Jorrat, 2003) Their findings confirmed trends found in research 
on developed democracies: turnout was found to be directly 
related to a person's economic wellbeing. Unfortunately, 
individual level data on the scale required to replicate Canton and 
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Jorrat's study for all of Latin America simply does not exist. We 
must rely instead on broader measures at the macroeconomic 
level which can at least give some indication of the relative size 
of the pools of voters and non-voters based on socioeconomic 
conditions. In other words, I assume that declines in 
macroeconomic performance will push greater numbers of people 
into lower socioeconomic status, making them less likely to vote 
and thus driving down turnout at the aggregate level. Likewise, 
positive macroeconomic performance should be linked to 
increased voter participation. 
The Impact of Political Consequences 
The political consequences associated with the 
implementation of the Washington Consensus are many. During 
the period of statist development, the state controlled most 
economic activity and had an array of policy options at its 
disposal. Due to the shift toward market-based economic policy, 
the state controls little economic activity and has lost its array of 
policy options. The significance of this in terms of participation 
is that it has undermined the most historically important 
mobilizational and representative institutions in the region: 
organized labor, political parties, and legislatures. At the heart of 
this impact are the particular disincentives for both individual 
and collective action that are associated with the neoliberal 
model. As Kurtz notes, 
[Market reforms] raise significant barriers to collective 
political action and thus induce a decline in the 
organizational and mobilizational capacity of civil 
societyO[reforms] create collective action problems 
that inhibit the formation of groups (or for that matter 
the formation of collective interests) that are essential 
antecedents of political participationOthey can also 
reduce the scope of political decision making-that is, 
the set of issues properly thought of as regulated by 
public policy- which reduces the incentives for 
individuals to engage in political activity. (Kurtz, 272) 
Thus, beyond depressing individual motivation to 
participate, Kurtz argues that the reforms have seriously 
undermined those groups or institutions in society which might 
mobilize otherwise apathetic citizens to go to the polls. In the 
Latin American context, labor unions and political parties have 
been the primary agents of mobilization. 
Unions 
The basis of the collective action problem with regard to 
unions rests in labor market changes. Reforms have brought a 
shift in labor market structure, heavily favoring non-union 
sectors over the unionized sector. The traditional base, the 
organized and politically active unionized sector, around which 
mobilization of the working (or even peasant) classes would 
occur has severely weakened. This fragmentation has made 
collective action a logistical impossibility. Additionally, because 
governments are engaged in a small and rapidly shrinking 
amount of economic activity, labor mobilization against the state 
beyond the ballot box (e.g., protests, strikes, etc.) has become a 
largely useless endeavor. Thus, the Washington Consensus has 
critically undermined the capacity of one of the most effective 
vehicles for mobilization, organized labor, to fulfill its historic 
function. 
Political Parties 
The impact of market reform on the political parties of 
Latin America has been equally significant. The implementation 
of the Washington Consensus has in many ways stripped parties 
of the two primary mechanisms they have historically utilized to 
mobilize voters: policy alternatives and tangible benefits. Prior 
to marketization, parties enticed people to the polls by presenting 
them with clear choices in the form of programmatic alternatives. 
Though the cost of such intense ideological competition was 
frequently polarization and.'occasionally serious violence, there 
is no denying that parties in most countries in the region were 
routinely able to project elections as high-stakes affairs in which 
voters felt compelled to participate. Not so today, liberalization 
and globalization have placed ever-increasing pressure on 
governments, and by extension the parties which hope to control 
them, to deliver policy options that are consistent with investor 
expectations. Because of the enormous political and economic 
risks associated with enacting (or even promising) policies in 
conflict with the market model, party platforms have become 
overwhelmingly inore responsive to investor expectations than 
to popular demands. 
The second key mobilizational mechanism used by parties 
was based on their ability to reward their backers in tangible 
ways. Preceding inarketization, the universal characteristic of 
Latin American party systems \Yas patronage, "which entails an 
exchange of material benefits for political support." (Roberts, 
44) These benefits, took the forms of employment, favors, 
contracts, or subsidies. In the neoliberal context of fiscal prudence 
and ever-declining state activity, parties are increasingly less 
able to deliver these material rewards. As a result, the entire logic 
of the old system has effectively vanished, and with it, much of 
the mobilizational capacity of parties. 
Legislatures and Executives 
At the beginning of the dual transition, there was a great 
deal of concern that the drastic and difficult reforms called for by 
the Washington Consensus would be virtually impossible to 
carry out in a context of representative democracy. (Armijo et al., 
162-164) Agreement slowly emerged in the region that the only 
way to overcome this challenge , was to somehow insulate 
economic policymaking from public d~:Ua~ds. This ultimately 
led to the appearance of what Guillermo O'Donnell labeled 
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"delegative democracy" throughout the hemisphere. (O'Donnell, 
1994) This new "species" of democracy differs in fundamental 
ways from classical representative democracy. In "delegative" 
systems, presidential candidates feel no compelling need to 
follow through on their campaign promises once elected to 
office. 
This means that presidents in such systems see themselves 
not as representatives ofthe people (and therefore obliged to be 
responsive to popular demand), but as leaders chosen to do what 
they think is best for the country, even if it is in conflict with the 
wishes of voters. In order to carry out this delegated mandate, 
executives must effectively exclude not just the demands of the 
public at large, but also of their elected representatives, the 
legislators. (O'Donnell, 59-61) According to Lasagna and 
Cardenal, this creates 
... a vicious circle with pernicious consequences for 
democracy. Presidents demand more power to govern 
on the pretext that parties and legislatures are weak 
institutions, but this accumulation of power, rather 
than resolving the problem, further aggravates it, 
weakening the key instruments society has for 
enforcing accountability, further distancing citizens 
from the public interest, and deteriorating democratic 
life. (Lasagna & Cardenal 132) 
As the legislature becomes less and less able to impact 
public policy, citizens will naturally become less and less 
concerned with who occupies its seats, and it is reasonable to 
assume that turnout, especially for legislative elections, will 
decline. 
In sum, the basic assumption underlying the political 
consequences hypothesis is that if unions are shrinking and 
becoming marginalized, parties-are becoming programmatically 
indistinguishable and unable,'to offer material rewards to their 
backers, legislatures are largely sidestepped when it comes to 
policymaking, and presidents enact policy based on technocratic 
criteria rather than in response to popular demands, it is hardly 
surprising that Latin American voters have concluded that voting 
is largely a futile endeavor. 
Overview of Descriptive Evidence: 
Before moving on to a more detailed explanation and test 
of my main hypotheses, it is appropriate to first take a broad 
overview of economic and political conditions in Latin America 
during the post-reform period to see whether there are indications 
that the sorts of trends we described above are in fact present. 
Economic Performance 
In assessing the record of the Washington Consensus in 
terms of economic performance to date, the best that can be said 
is that the results are mixed. The biggest success of reform by far 
was the curbing of hyperinflation. Inflation rates dropped from 
a staggering regional average of 1,152 percent in 1990 to average 
rates of less than 20 percent by the late 1990s. (World Bank, 
2004) 
Consumer Price lndeJt 
1200 -~------·-' 
1980 ,.., 
L__ ______________________________________ -----------------------------
(World Bank. 2004) This graph displays the average regional inflation nte as measured by the change m the 
consumer price index (CP1) from 1980..1996. CPl reflects price level changes of a basket of consumer goods. 
Beyond this very significant triumph, market reforms have 
generally not lived up to expectations. Real GOP growth has 
been tepid at best. Despite showing an average growth rate of 
around 3.9 percent over the 1990-1996 period, growth slowed to 
an average 2.4 percent over the 1997-2002 period. More 
significantly, creation of wealth is not keeping pace with the 
population growth, as GOP per capita growth has lagged behind 
real GOP growth by around two percent and has actually been 
negative in three out of the last four years. (World Bank, 2004) 
;---------------·-·-----·---------- -·-- ·-·----------·--
Real Regional Gross Domestic Product lndlciltors 
, ~-~-~~R~~~-----~~~~~~:~~:.: _____ . _________ _ 
(~~idB~~-"2004) This gra~bru-;1~-;~~-~~.~~~~;;~~l-;~J~ domestic product and real gross 
domestic prodw;t per capita grov.ih rates from 198()...2002. 
Significantly, evidence suggests that this shortfall in growth 
has been borne large! y by the lower income groups. The Estimated 
Household Income Inequality index (EHII) indicates that 
inequality has increased more than I 0 percent since the onset of 
the debt crisis, a disturbing trend in a region already plagued by 
some of the most unequal wealth distribution in the world. 
(University of Texas Inequality Project, 2004) 
,------------------- ---------------- ---------------------
Estim!1ed Household Income lneguatUy 
:: r= = =~ ::: _::: -=~~ !:h=-=--------- ~--. f 44 --------- ------------------------ ----------------------- : 
- 43 -- ----------~---"------~-~---------·--------------------·- --·-----: 
~- ~ '~ '~ ~ ,_ = ~ ~ 'm 
(University of Texas, 2004) Increasing regional esttmated household income ineq~ali_ty (EHli) indi~es indicate 
increasing inequality. A score ofO l~dicates ~eel equal1ty ""hi i.e a sco~e of tOO tndJca.tes perfect mequal1ty. Tile 
EHII index. is calculated using combmed stansucs on both wage mequahty and ecooonuc resource control. 
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Finally, reforms have failed to create jobs. The regional 
unemployment rate has risen from 7.3 percent in 1990 to 9.5 
percent in 2002, reaching double digits from 1999-2001. (World 
Bank, 2004) 
It seems clear, then, that in most regards the market reforms 
at the heart of the dual transition have thus far not lived up to 
expectations. Of course, there are many reasons behind this 
suboptimal performance, some of which are undoubted! y beyond 
the control of Latin American policymakers. From a political 
perspective, though, these reasons may be irrelevant, for as 
Kurtz notes, "if neoliberal [market] policies are not causally 
responsible for Latin America's economic problems, the political 
fact remains that they have become associated with them in the 
popular mind." (287) 
Political Peifonnance 
It is, of course, much more difficult to assess the political 
impact of the reform era. Nonetheless, there are indications that 
the sort of damaging consequences of neoliberalism on 
mobilizational institutions described earlier are indeed present 
in the region. 
In assessing the record of the Washington Consensus in 
terms of political performance, the results are grim. The dual 
transition period has witnessed the flexibilization and 
informalization of the economy. Evidence demonstrates that the 
unionized, politically-influential formal employment sector is 
shrinking. During the 1990-2002 period, this focal point of 
political organization diminished by more than five percent. (See 
Table 4) 
As the size of the formal sector has declined, its 
mobilizational ability has been undermined. One way to measure 
union mobilization is in terms of strike and lockout rates, which 
give some indication of how active the organized labor sector is. 
The data show that labor action is increasingly less likely. The 
average yearly regional strike rate has declined from a high of 
310 during the 1985-1989 period to 113 during the 2000-2003 
period. (See Table 5) The assertion is that the decline in strike 
rates does not reflect satisfaction (in light of increased 
unemployment and 1nequality with lagging GDP per capita 
growth) with Washington Consensus economic policy, but rather, 
it reflects an incapacitated organizational ability caused by labor 
market changes 
The impact of neoliberal reform on representative 
institutions transcends labor unions. Political parties, legislatures, 
and executives have also lost significant ground in terms of 
public opinion. Polling data indicates that average regional 
confidence in these institutions has declined 10, 12, and two 
percent respectively since 1997. (See Table 6) In a region of 
ideological uni-polarity, fiscal limitation, technocratic policy-
making, and unresponsive leadership, citizens now view those 
institutions which once represented their interests as no longer 
effective 
The loss of credibility of representative institutions is 
linked to the perception that these institutions have surrendered 
their traditional power and policy influence during the reform 
era, particularly to the private business sector. When asked who 
wielded the most power in their respective countries, more 
people identified big business as the most powerful sector than 
Country 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2002 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
48.0 
59.4 
62.1 
54.3 
58.8 
44.4 
42.4 
64.0 
47.3 
60.9 
50.7 
54.9 
61.2 
56.7 
36.3 
41.1 
62.9 
"41.9 
44.6 
58.7 
-
-55.5 
54.0 
,,,62.0 
44.4 -
55.0 
46.7 
48.2 
34.9 
45.6 
60:1 
'39.1 
42.3 
57.8 
Venezuela 61.4 55.5 48.5 
Region~! Average 54.8 51.3 _ _ _ _ . _ 49.6 
~.Intema~onal Labor. Or~anizati~n, 2003) Figures indicate the average percentage of the total labor force which is 
formal for_ the per:od m quesn~n. Formal laborers normally work under contract, enjoy employer benefits, and 
have a working envrronment subJect to state regulation. 
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Count!Y_ 1980- 1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 
Argentina 431 
Bolivia 273 211 51 81 
Brazil 226 2067 883 800 396 
Chile 56 67 213 156 105 
Colombia 183 123 320 
Costa Rica 22 15 22 12 
Dominican Republic 2 
Ecuador 91 104 64 11 
El Salvador 22 40 28 155 25 
Guatemala 14 18 24 12 
Honduras 38 36 53 58 63 
Nicaragua 47 65 8 0 
Panama 12 8 
Peru 714 686 293 75 47 
Venezuela 113 36 7 18 31 
155 310 177 143 113 Re~ional Avera~e 
(International Labor Organization, 2005) A strike or lockout is generally defined as an occurrence that causes the 
disruption of enterprise activity, though different nations adopt specific variations ~fthis defmition. 
Institution 1997 1998 1999-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Change 
Political Parties 28 21 20 19 14 11 18 -10 
legislatures 36 27 28 24 23 17 24 -12 
Presidents 39 38 39 30 31 37 -2 
(Latinobarometro, 2004) Figures indicate the percentage of poll respondents who expressed some confidence, 
confidence, or strong confidence in these institutions. 
Count!Y_ 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brasil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Business 
70.38 
34.26 
42.24 
68.49 
47.02 
38.42 
46.75 
47.30 
29.49 
42.90 
36.75 
45.50 
The State 
11.66 
36.93 
24.00 
12.50 
13.05 
45.17 
15.67 
36.05 
45.92 
34.01 
41.76 
19.01 
Political Parties 
12.87 
21.85 
14.22 
3.04 
10.95 
16.41 
12.64 
6.54 
7.83 
11.24 
12.14 
16.38 
Paraguay 32.20 35.59 15.68 
Peru 33.09 33.50 2.96 
Uruguay 42.01 43.01 10.07 
Venezuela 28.69 34.33 9.48 
Average 42.84 30.14 11.52 
(Latinobarometro, 2002 in United Nations Development Program, 2004) The figures represent response to the 
question, "In your opinion, which of the following has the most power in this country?" 
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those citing the state and political parties combined. (See Table 
7) If, indeed, most citizens feel that their governments and parties 
are more or less inconsequential relative to private economic 
interests, then what incentive is there to vote? 
Modeling Voter Turnout in Latin America: 
At this point, I have shown the significance of the 
turnout decline, reported opinion data on discontent, provided 
some conceptual justification for my hypothesized link between 
market reform and that decline, and supplied some preliminary 
descriptive evidence that indicates the presence of the trends I 
suggested are at work. I now turn to a more rigorous test of my 
two hypotheses, which in specific form are the following: 
Hypothesis One: Declines in socioeconomic conditions 
resulting/rom the implementation of market refonns will produce 
declines in electoral turnout. 
Hypothesis Two: Declines in the strength, effectiveness, 
and performance of the major mobilizational institutions (i.e., 
unions, parties and legislatures) resulting from the 
implementation of market refonns will produce declines in 
electoral turnout. 
Both of the major hypotheses have a number of sub-
hypotheses, which are essentially single indicator linear 
relationships between various independent variables to our 
dependent variable, voter turnout. These are: 
ECONOMIC Real GOP per Capita 
Inflation 
Inequality 
Unemployment 
POLITICAL Privatization 
Trade Liberalization 
Labor 
Voter Turnout 
Financial Liberalization 
Consumption Taxation 
Overall Structural Reform 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
The dependent variable in the regression model is voter 
turnout. The model independently considers turnout in two types 
of elections: legislative and presidential. The data include results 
from 17 Latin American nations covering democratic elections 
from 1980-2003. Turnout has been tabulated for 78 presidential 
elections and 85 legislative elections. In this analysis, turnout is 
defined as the percentage of registered voters who cast valid 
votes. The data are from a compilation of electoral statistics 
developed by Dr. Jeff Ryan using official government sources. 
A full listing of the original sources is available in the Turnout 
Reference Appendix. 
Economic Hypothesis Variables. 
Most comparative political research, especially that dealing 
with the developing world, is limited by the availability and 
reliability of necessary data. Nonetheless, the economic variables 
for which I have been able to gather sufficient data should 
provide a reasonably good test of my hypotheses. 
Percent Change in Real GDP per Capita measures the 
ability of an economy to generate wealth in real terms relative to 
the population size. The coverage of this variable is 1979-2002. 
Inflation measures the rate at which prices are increasing: 
and is a measure of overall economic stability. The consumer • 
price index (CPI) will be used as the inflation measure in this .· 
research. This shows the rate at which prices of basic consumer 
goods are increasing on an annual basis. The coverage of CPI is 
from 1979-2002. 
Inequality is an indicator of the distribution of resources 
within a nation. The Estimated Household Income Inequillity 
(EHII) index will be used as the measure. This index combines 
inequality data on wages and pay with that of absolute resource > 
control. (Galbraith & Kum, 2004) This means that it can account :. 
for the disparity in earning between low-wage workers and high-
income salary employees while simultaneously considering the 
relative differences in net assets among various holders. A score 
of zero indicates perfect equality while a score of 100 indicates ·. · 
perfect inequality. The coverage of the EHII index is 1979-1999. 
Rate of Total· Unemployment measures the percentage of 
the active laborforcethat is unable to obtain employment. The 
coverage of unemployme11t statistics is 1980-2002. 
PoliticalHypothesis Variables 
The proble~sof data availability for political variables are 
even more pronounced than for economic variables. As a result, 
I was forced inste;d to rely on an indirect test of this hypothesis 
using proxy indicators for the relationships I described earlier. 
Specifically, I will use measures of the reform itself, rather than 
of the impact of that reform. These variables take the form of a 
series of indices constructed by Eduardo Lora of the Inter-
American Development Bank to measure the extent of reform in 
each of five particular areas, as well as a composite index 
measuring overall structural reform. Lora's dataset covers all of 
the countries in Latin America included in my analysis from 
1985-1999. 
Privatization Index is calculated a~ the ratio of the 
cumulative value of privatization to total GDP for the year in 
question. (Lora, 21) This indicator is not an ideal measure of state 
industrial involvem~nt, as it penalizes thos~ ~ations with nothing 
to privatize or that retain profitable industry 
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Trade Reform Index is the average of the average level and 
dispersion of tariffs. (Lora, 20) It is reasonable to assert that as 
tariff levels and dispersion have changed, the level of overall 
government involvement in regulating trade has changed with it. 
Labor Reform Index has four components. They are level 
of flexibility for hiring workers, the cost oflayoffs or termination, 
cost of overtime and holiday employment, and required 
contributions to benefit plans. (Lora, 21) 
Domestic Financial Reform Index is the average of three 
indices. The first measures the level of government control over 
bank borrowing and lending interest rates. The second is the 
reserves to demand deposits ratio. The final is the quality of 
government intervention in the financial system. (Lora, 20) 
Tax Reform Index is composed of five parts. It combines 
measures of the highest marginal tax rate for both individuals and 
corporations, the value added tax (VAT) rate, and the efficiency 
of VAT and income tax collection. (Lora, 21) The index displays 
the movement from progressive taxation on income to regressive 
taxation on consumption. The shift is one of government policy. 
It does not indicate a withdrawal of the state but a redirection that 
is a direct consequence of market reform. 
General Structural Reform Index is the simple average of 
the previous five indices for the year in question. (Lora, 19) 
While it is unlikely that each dimension of this index contributes 
equally to the economic and policy consequences of reform, it is 
the only aggregate measure available. It can be used to gauge 
voters' general response to reform rather than to specific policy 
areas. 
Model Specification 
.. Multiple regression analysis provides the most suitable 
framework for testing my hypotheses. However, in its basic 
form, it.has a fundamental limitation. It can consider only one 
cross sectional unit at a time. In the current research, a cross 
section is a Latin American country. Because we consider 
multiple countries or cross sections simultaneously, a variation 
on standard regression analysis is required. The most appropriate 
technique under these conditions is cross-sectional time series 
regression, which uses traditional multiple regression to calculate 
the proper 
B value for each independent variable in each cross section. 
It then takes the summation of the calculations in order to 
determine the proper B values when all cross sections are 
considered simultaneously. (SAS Institute, 2005) Thus, when 
considering changes in the dependent variable, cross-sectional 
time series analysis indicates the explanatory capacity of each 
independent variable considered over all countries. 
Two specifications have been made to the basic cross-
sectional time series regression model to improve its accuracy 
and applicability to modeling voter turnout in Latin America. 
First, all independent variables have been lagged one year. This 
is because individuals need time to process and react to economic 
and political changes. Second, indicator, or dummy, variables 
have been included. These variables detect the significance of 
unmeasured qualitative or quantitative effects which cause 
variation in the dependent variable. They measure the importance 
of things other than the previously described independent 
variables. The inclusion of dummy variables has been specified 
for country specific effects and/or time effects. By lagging the 
independent variables and including the dummy variables, I 
hope to produce a more comprehensive and robust picture of 
electoral turnout. 
Using these basic specifications, I then estimated a series 
of models designed to test a broad array of different combinations 
of the various hypothesized relationships described above. For 
each of these combinations, models were estimated separately 
for presidential and legislative elections. For both of the main 
hypotheses, I tested each of the specified independent variables 
(economic and political) alone and in all possible combinations 
with each other, as well as in combination with the country and 
time dummy variables. I then estimated a "kitchen sink" model 
which included both economic and political variables (as well as 
the dummies.) 
Results and Analysis: 
Presidential Turnout 
E! GOP 05052 0.0837 0.891 
E2 Inflation 0.00199 0.2002 0.888 
E3 GOP 0.816 0.009 0.906 
Inflation 0.0038 0.019 
ES Inequality .080972 0.3695 0.915 
E6 Unemployment 1.7382 0.2608 0.968 
P1 Prtvatizat1on Index -7.95575 0.1682 0.9 
P2 Trade Reform Index -13.0354 0.009 0.916 
P3 Labor Reform Index -13.1002 0.6605 0.894 
P4 Financial Reform Index ·12.5601 0.0207 0.911 
P5 Tax Reform Index -32.5733 0.0195 0.911 
P6 General Reform Index -26.047 0.0058 0.918 
KS1 General Reform fndex -31.69 0.005 0.921 
GOP 0.1999 0.5143 
InflatiOn -0 00084 0.6612 
Stat!'itlcal !.l£nlflcan~c 1s cstubltshcd at aPr value of 05 or ~c ... ~ 
•tnchcatc:s thai I he dummy \'ariablc ~as mdudcd m lhc model RC'sol!s are suppre~~. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
The model of presidential election voter turnout in Latin 
America revealed minor support for economic indicator variables 
in isolation from one another. The test results demonstrate that 
the interaction between real GOP per capita and inflation has a 
statistically significant impact on turnout. A one percent decline 
in real GOP per capita will cause a .82 percent decline in voter 
turnout. This is the direct relationship anticipated by the economic 
consequence hypothesis. Inflation also produces a significant 
result, but in an unexpected direction. A one percent decline in 
inflation will cause a .004 percent decline in voter turnout. The 
economic consequence hypothesis expectation was that increases 
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in inflation would cause decreases in turnout. On the basis of 
these conflicting results and absent support for other economic 
variables, the economic consequence hypothesis is rejected for 
presidential elections. 
The voter turnout model revealed robust support for political 
consequence variables in isolation. When tested independently, 
the trade, financial, and tax reform indices all achieved high 
levels of statistical significance and caused voter turnout to 
change in the direction anticipated by the political consequence 
hypothesis. As reform increased, turnout declined. When the 
indices were tested simultaneously, however, they were found to 
display mutlicollinearity, meaning they explain the same variation 
in the dependent variable and share the statistical significance of 
each independent variable in isolation. (Billingsley, et al., 681) 
This suggested that the overall reform process may be more 
important than any single aspect of reform. To explore this 
possibility, a model using only the aggregate general reform 
index was estimated. It achieved a high level of statistical 
significance. An increase of 0.1 in the general reform index was 
found to cause a 2.6 percent decline in turnout. On the basis of 
these findings, the political consequence hypothesis is accepted 
for presidential elections. 
The model of voter turnout revealed no support for the 
importance of the interaction between economic indicator and 
political indicator variables, or the "kitchen sink" model. This 
suggests that the previous findings represent the proper 
explanation of the decline in voter turnout for presidential 
elections. Turnout is primarily a function of the political 
consequences of market reform. 
Legislative Turnout 
E1 
E2 
E3 
E4 
P1 
P2 
P3 
GOP 
Inflation 
Inequality 
Unemployment 
Privatization Index 
Trade Reform Index 
labor Reform Index 
0.647 
0.00117 
·1.2319 
.0.2831 
·14.6023 
-23.4531 
-44.6943 
P4 Financial Reform Index -19.0428 
P5 Tax Reform Index -59.155 
P6 General Reform Index -47.9488 
KS1 General Reform Index -58.5895 
0.009 
0.5232 
0.176 
0.5267 
0.1103 
0.0027 
0.319 
0.0113 
0.001 
00007 
0.0002 
GOP 0.64546 ().()767 
Statisucal stgmficance IS established at aPr \'alue of .05 or Jess. 
•Indicates that the dummy "ariable was included in the modeL Results are supprtssed. 
0.93 X X 
0.7022 X X 
0.9422 X X 
0.9307 X X 
0.8034 X 
0.8377 X 
0.794 X 
0.8248 X 
0.8447 X 
0.6493 X 
0.8631 X 
The model of legislative election voter turnout in Latin 
America revealed minor support for economic indicator variables 
in isolation. The test results demonstrate that real GDP per capita 
has a statistically significant impact on turnout. A one percent 
decline in real GDP per capita will cause a .65 percent decline in 
voter turnout. This direct relationship is anticipated by the 
economic consequence hypothesis. However, the failure of the 
other economic indicator variables to achieve significance casts 
doubt on the original economic consequence hypothesis. This 
hypothesis can only be accepted in modified form for legislative 
elections: as real GDP per capita declines, voter turnout will 
decline. 
The voter turnout model revealed considerable support for 
political indicator variables in isolation. When tested 
independently, the trade, financial, and tax reform indices were 
statistically significant and had the inverse relationship to voter 
turnout anticipated by the political consequence hypothesis. 
Consistent with the finding for presidential turnout, the individual 
reform indices were found to display mutlicollinearity. When the 
general reform index was tested, it was robustly significant. An 
increase of .1 in the general reform index was found to cause a 
4. 7 percent decline in turnout. On the basis of these findings, the 
political consequence hypothesis is accepted for legislative 
elections. 
The model of voter turnout in Latin America revealed no 
support for the importance of the interaction between economic 
indicator and political indicator variables. This suggests that the 
previous findings represent the proper explanation of voter 
turnout decline for legislative elections. It is principally a function 
of the political consequences of market reform but real GDP per 
capita also has explanatory capacity. 
Discussion of Results: 
The previous. section analyzed the results of the model of 
voter turnout in Latin America according to their application to·· 
either presidential. or legislative elections. This section will 
merge those finding in order to explore the model results as they 
apply to each of the hypotheses. By doing this, broad trends in 
voter turnout can be determined and the applicability, or lack 
thereof, of each hypothesis can be analyzed. The analysis of each 
hypothesis will proceed in two steps. First, the independent 
variables that achieved significance across both presidential and 
legislative elections will be evaluated. Second, those independent 
variables that failed to achieve significance will be explored. By 
merging the results from presidential and legislative elections, a 
vision of the for~es that drive voter turnout in Latin America will 
emerge. 
Economic Consequence Hypothesis: Economic Deterioration 
--Turnout Decline 
The assertion that economic underpeiformance is driving 
the decline in voter turnout iri Latin America found little support ·.· 
in eitherpresideritial or legislative elections. The only independent 
variable to achieve statistical significance in each election type. 
was real GDP per caplta. In som~ ways, the fact that this variable 
was the only one which achieved significance does more to , 
undermine the economic hypothesis than to bolster it. Recall that 
this hypothesis was derived from the voting literature that linked 
an individual's socioeconomic status to turnout. My assumption 
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was that macroeconomic changes in each of the four variables 
would either expand or shrink the pool of people in the traditional 
'non-voting' categories and thus shape overall turnout. Yet 
among these four variables, GDP per capita is clearly the 
weakest indicator in this regard, since it tells us very little about 
who is suffering or prospering during periods of growth or 
contraction. The strongest indicator, based on the assumptions 
underlying the economic hypothesis, would clearly be 
unemployment, followed by the more intermediate strength of 
inflation and inequality variables. 
The failure of unemployment, inflation, and inequality to 
achieve statistical significance in both election types thus severely 
weakens the economic consequence hypothesis. It is possible, of 
course, that my inability to uncover a relationship between 
economic performance and electoral partiCipation is due to the 
lack of more appropriate data. Nonetheless, the findings remain 
puzzling, particularly the lack of significance for unemployment. 
One would expect that high and chronic unemployment rates 
would create a substantial pool of poor, marginalized citizens 
who would withdraw from the political arena. A possible 
explanation for the weakness of this variable, though by no 
means a strong one, is that the relationship between unemployment 
and turnout is non-linear, where initial rises in joblessness 
actually produce more political activity which then drops off as 
time goes by and hopelessness sets in. 
Something similar may be going on with inflation as well. 
Following years of hyperinflation, Latin Americans may well 
have developed a substantially higher tolerance threshold for 
variations in the consumer price index. The enormous variation 
in the values of this indicator, which"range from roughly -2 
percent to· nearly 12,000 percent, may, also be an important 
reason for the lack of significant findings. Meanwhile, inequality 
may have failed to achieve significance due either to a similar 
regional tolerance for high inequality orllecause changes in the 
concentration of wealth are difficult for ordinary people to 
discern. T<!ken as a whole,then: the findings call into serious 
question the importance of economic performance as a driver of 
voter turnout in Latin America. · · . ' ' · 
Political Consequence Hypothesis: Political Impact of 
Refonn--Turnout Decline 
The hypothesis that the political impact of market reform 
is driving the decline in voter turnout in Latin America found 
robust support in both presidential and legislative elections. The 
trade, financial, tax and general structural reform indices were all 
significant across both election types: The significance of the tax 
reform index indicates that as the preferred method of taxation 
has shifted from income and trade to consumption, turnout has 
declined. Recall that consumption taxation often assumes a 
regressi~e character as ·lower in~orrie groups devote a higher 
\~ 
percentage of their income to consumption than higher income 
groups. 
The findings of significance for both the trade and financial 
liberalization indices are also consistent with the assumptions 
underlying the political hypothesis. As the state has surrendered 
more and more control over the trading and financial sectors to 
private market forces, it has become less and less relevant in 
policymaking terms. In sharp contrast to the statist era, the 
decisions which effect citizens most directly are now more or 
less made outside the political arena, rendering participation in 
elections a less meaningful activity. Though these indicators are, 
as noted earlier, only indirect measures of the political 
consequences of market reform, it seems more plausible to 
assume that it is those consequences that people are responding 
to rather than the reforms themselves. It is difficult to imagine, 
for example, that Bolivian peasants and Honduran slum-dwellers 
base their decision to vote on adjustments to the reserves to 
demand deposits ratio. 
Further support is indicated by the significance of the 
general structural reform index across both presidential and 
legislative elections. As the reform process has proceeded and 
the activities of government have declined, turnout has declined 
with it. Again, it seems very unlikely that any but the most 
sophisticated citizens are directly linking their turnout decision 
to the complex array of reform measures captured by the index. 
The failure of the privatization and labor reform indices to 
achieve statistical significance in either presidential or legislative 
elections would seem, at first glance, to weaken the validity of 
the political consequence hypothesis. However, the lack of 
significance is more likely a function of how these indices are 
calculated by Lora than of a lack of an underlying relationship. 
Recall that the privatization index reflects the ratio of the 
cumulative value of privatization to total GDP for the year in 
question. This method produces some paradoxical and rather 
contradictory results, particularly from the perspective of this 
analysis. Specifically, it yields scores which have virtually 
nothing to do with the percentage of the national economy held 
directly by the state. A low score could, for example, indicate a 
state which had divested itself of unprofitable holdings but 
retained control of valuable assets, or a state which entered into 
the reform period with very little if anything to privatize in the 
first place. In other words, economies which were already 
overwhelmingly private at the onset of the Washington Consensus 
are effectively lumped in with economies which have failed to 
follow through on the privatization agenda. If we are to accurately 
measure the impact of privatization on turnout, it is clear that an 
alternative measure is needed. 
Like the privatization index, the lack of significance of the 
labor reform index does not necessarily damage the validity of 
the political consequence hypothesis. The index relies on legal 
regulations about working conditions, pay, and termination. 
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There are a number of problems with this approach. One is that 
it does not consider enforcement of these regulations, which can 
vary dramatically. Another is that such regulations only relate to 
the formal sector, which as we have seen, accounts for a shrinking 
proportion of the overall labor force in many countries. Finally, 
in statistical terms, this index has shown the least variation 
(across countries and across time) of any of the reform measures. 
Because these scores are virtually flat for nearly every country 
throughout the entire time span, it is next to impossible for them 
to register significantly in any regression model. 
On the basis of this model's explanatory capacity, then, the 
hypothesis that the political impact of Washington Consensus is 
driving the observed decline in voter turnout in Latin America is 
accepted. 
Conclusion: 
The political consequences of Latin America's dual 
transition have clearly been profound. Throughout the region, 
powerful unions stand crippled, political parties are seemingly 
adrift, legislatures appear increasingly less able to fulfill their 
representational function, and executives are growing more 
unaccountable and insulated. 
In the current geopolitical climate, governments in Latin 
America confront a harsh reality. Even moderate deviations 
from the reforms embodied in the Washington Consensus are 
met with serious reactions from the international system. Yet as 
they conform to the standards of that system, they may be 
undermining the very foundation of democratic governance. The 
danger lies in the possibility that traditional forms of political 
participation, like voting, may give way to more disruptive 
participatory mechanisms. For while it is obviously possible for 
elected civilian governments to oversee the painful transition 
from statist to market economies, it is by no means certain that 
they can do so without disrupting the very fabric of democratic 
rule: electoral participation. 
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Turnout Reference Appendix: Voter Turnout 
Special thanks must be extended to Dr. Jeff Ryan of the 
University of Arkansas for access· to his database of Latin 
American voter turnout. The followingare the sources used in 
the construction of his database. 
Compilation· Sources: 
Institute foi Democracy'& Electoral Assistance. Voter Turnout from: 
1945 tot 1998: A Global Report on .Political Participation. h11J2;11 
www.idea.int/voter turnout/index.html 
Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH). (1995). Partidos 
y Clase Politica en America Laitna en los 90, San Jose, Costa Rica: lnstituto 
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. 
Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH). (1998). 
Elecciones y Democracia en America Latina, 1992-1996: Urnas y Desencanto 
Politico. San Jose, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos 
Humanos. 
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). Election Guide. 
http:// www.ifes.org/ eguide/ elecguide.htrn·. 
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Official Government Sources 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Faculty comment: 
Camara Nacional Electoral 
Corte Nacional Electoral 
Tnbunal Superior Eleitoral 
Ministerio del Interior 
Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil 
Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones 
Junta Central Electoral 
Tnbunal Supremo Electoral 
Tnbunal Supremo Electoral 
Tnbunal Supremo Electoral 
Consejo Supremo Electoral 
Tribunal Electoral de Panama 
Tnbunal Superior de Justicia Electoral 
Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorates 
Consejo Nacional Electoral 
In his letter to the Inquiry publication board supporting the 
publication of Mr. Younger's paper, Professor Jeffrey Ryan 
made the following remarks: 
Ryan's research project, which was funded in part 
through a SURF grant, is without question one of the 
most ambitious, well-crafted and innovative that I 
have supervised during my fifteen years at the 
university, including the half-dozen Masters theses I 
have directed. It focuses on a topic that I have been 
grapplingwithforanumberofyears-therelationship 
between :macroeconomic structural reform and 
democratic participation in Latin America. The 
question is driven by a puzzling and • ~isturbing 
observation: the widespread adoption of market 
reforms has coincided with a aramatic decline in 
voter turnout in the region. 
Despite the obvious importance of this trend for 
democratic consolidation in the hemisphere, 
surprisingly little literature exists on the topic. This is, 
I suspect, due in part to a central challenge confronting 
researchers trying to assess the relationship. 
Specifically, how is it possible to disaggregate the 
economic consequences of market reform from the 
political consequences of those reforms? Put 
differently, there are plausible reasons for suspecting 
that the socioeconomic "pain" caused by structural 
adjustment (e.g., unemployment, poverty, inequality, 
etc.) will depress turnout. There are equally persuasive 
reasons to assume that the political effects of this 
rapid macroeconomic transition, especially on 
representative institutions like labor. ';lnions and 
http://www.pin.gov.ar/cne/ 
http://www.bolivian.com/cne/ 
http://www.tse.gov.br/ 
http:/ /www.elecciones.gov.cll 
http://www.registraduria.gov.co/ 
http://www.tse.go.cr/ 
http://www.jce.do/jce/ 
http:/ /tse.satnet.net/tse/ 
http://www.tse.gob.sv/ 
http://www.tse.org.gt/ 
http://www.cse.gob.ni/ 
http://www.tribunal-
electoral.gob.pa/ 
http://www.tsje.org.py/ 
http://www.onpe.gob.pe/ 
http://www.cne.gov. ve/ 
political parties, may result in a drop in voter 
participation. Since both occur simultaneously, the 
daunting task facing researchers is how to determine 
if one or the other (or neither) is actually related to 
rising abstentionism. 
I must confess that! was both surprised and impressed 
with the straightforward and even elegant solution 
that Ryan proposed to a problem that has left 
researchers (including myself) struggling. He first 
provided a sound conceptual justification for 
considering the two types of consequences separately. 
This justification was rooted squarely in the traditional 
literature on voting as well as the emerging literature 
on the political impact of neoliberalism. He then went 
on to devise an operationalization scheme which 
would enable him to transform those concepts into 
measurable variables. The next step was the arduous 
collection and compilation of the necessary data, which 
I know from experience, is no small feat when dealing 
with the developing world. Finally, he consulted a 
number of faculty on campus as well as the literature 
to determine the most appropriate statistical 
methodology for carrying out a rigorous test of his 
hypotheses. In this endeavor, I must confess, he was 
largely on his own, as the method he ultimately 
settled on, cross-sectional time series regression 
analysis, lies far beyond my zone of competence. 
His findings are troubling. His analysis indicates that 
it is not the economic shortcomings of market reform 
(whichcanpresumablybecorrected)whicharedriving 
people from the polls, but the far more pernicious 
impact those reforms have had on the groups which 
have historically mobilized citizens to participate. 
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The implications of these findings are profound not 
only in a research sense, but also in terms of the 
quality of democratic life in Latin America and other 
regions undergoing wholesale reform. 
This thesis represents in a very real way the 
culmination of Ryan's undergraduate experience here 
at the University of Arkansas. Ryan is one of a handful 
of students I have had in the course of my fifteen year 
teaching career who balances all the most desirable 
traits we hope to see in a young scholar. He is 
intellectually curious, confident but not cocky, 
disciplined, responsible and exceptionally intelligent. 
In and out of class, Ryan has consistently exhibited a 
genuine interest in learning. This curiosity extends 
well beyond the "Hill." As you can see from his 
record, Ryan recently spent an academic semester 
studying in Cuba. Having spent a short time there, I 
can assure you that navigating Cuban society is 
challenging in nearly every sense, from going about 
routine daily necessities like eating and getting around 
to dealing with people whose perceptions of and 
attitudes towards US citizens are complex, to say the 
least. That Ryan was not only able to survive, but 
thrive in these conditions is clear evidence of his 
ability and eagerness to transform any situation, 
regardless of how difficult, into a positive learning 
experience. 
My role in Ryan's project has been much more that of 
sounding board, of co-enthusiast, of listening partner 
than that of supervisor. This project is, in every sense 
of the word, a result of his hard work, his insights and 
his passion for learning. I am just grateful that I was 
along for the very rewarding ride. 
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